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Carabba: Merk v. Jewel Food Stores: The Parol Evidence Rule Applied to Col

MERK v. JEWEL FOOD STORES:1 THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE APPLIED TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS - A TREND

TOWARD MORE FORMALITY IN THE NAME OF
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY?
I.

INTRODUCrION

A dispute arises in the course of collective bargaining.2 Management insists that a most favored nations clause be included in the
collective bargaining agreement. Labor refuses. As this dispute is the
only impediment towards reaching a final agreement, the parties diligently work out a resolution: management drops its demand for a
most favored nations clause in exchange for a promise offered by the
Union. What this promise consists of is not altogether clear. What is
clear, however, is that the Union's negotiators insisted this "side
agreement" remain oral, and that it was not subsequently ratified by
the Union membership.
Litigation involving the content of this agreement ensued. In
Merk, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
fused together two theories of law to exclude management's testimony
offered to prove the existence of the side agreement. First, the court
applied the parol evidence rule, not as it is applied in an ordinary
contracts analysis, but in a different manner in which, the court held,
was mandated by national labor policy.4 In conjunction with this
analysis, the court held that because the side agreement was not ratified by the rank and file, in violation of the union's constitution,
management was not entitled to rely on it.5
The dissent in Merk reached a diametrically opposed result. After
considering that the agreement was not ratified, and after applying the
parol evidence rule, the dissent concluded that management should be

1. Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., Jewel Cos., 945 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denie4 488 U.S. 956 (1992).
2. What follows is a synopsis of the facts in Merk A complete undertaking appears
infra part 11.
3. Merk, 945 F.2d at 899.
4. IeL
at 894.
5. 1& at 893.
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allowed to introduce evidence as to the agreement's terms.6 The difference in these two views is based upon two very different interpretations of national labor policy. The dissent looked to a national labor
policy which stresses flexibility, not formality, in labor relations,7
while the majority found that collective bargaining agreements must
be "more secure" against modification than are ordinary commercial
contracts!
Part II of this Comment outlines the facts of Merk. Part III traces the various aspects of its case history. Part IV sets forth the relevant case law prior to the Merk decision. Part V outlines the
majority's and dissent's position in Merk. Finally, Part VI adopts the
dissent's rationale; concludes that this position is not only mandated
by national labor policy, but is the only outcome which reduces the
type of uncertainty in labor relations created by the majority's holding, and; offers the theory of promissory estoppel as an alternative
method to resolve the case.
I1.

THE MERK FACTS

In September 1982, Jewel Food Stores, Inc. ("Jewel"), an operator of approximately 180 supermarkets, began negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with its workers, who were
represented by Local 881 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union ("Union").' The parties agreed to a contract which was
reduced to writing and subsequently ratified by Union membership on
January 27, 1983.1" The CBA did not include every element of the
parties' agreement." Both parties acknowledged that four days prior
to the CBA's execution, during a hallway conference, a deal was
struck. 2 The parties do not agree, however, on the exact terms of
this deal.'3 They do agree that, at the behest of the Union's negotiators, 4 its terms were not disclosed to, or ratified by, the Union
membership as required by the Union constitution and bylaws.

6. Id at 906.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id at
Id at
Id. at
Id at
Id.

900-02.
894.
890-91. The CBA was to run from September 15, 1982 to June 15, 1985. Id.
891.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 897.
Id Jewel claimed that the Union officials insisted the agreement remain oral because
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Jewel argued that because it was very concerned about the possible entrance of a "warehouse" competitor into the marketplace, it
insisted on the inclusion of a most favored nations clause"6 in the
CBA throughout the negotiations.17 The Union refused to accede to
this demand and the final CBA lacked such a clause." To offset the
lack of the most favored nations clause, Jewel argued it reached the
oral agreement with the Union. 9 Specifically, Jewel argued the
Union's president and two Jewel representatives (their chief negotiator
and corporate vice president) agreed to "an economic reopener with
full reservation of rights."" This provision would allow Jewel, upon
the entrance of a warehouse competitor into the market, to reopen the
economic terms of the CBA and re-negotiate wages.' The parties,
upon such occurrence, would proceed as though they were bargaining
over a new contract. 2 In addition, each party would retain their respective economic weapons, which include management's right to
unilaterally implement its final offer after reaching impasse, and the
Union's right to strike.' The Union countered that it did not agree
to a reopener clause, rather, it merely agreed to "sit and discuss"
Jewel's competitive position when and if the warehouse competitor
arrived in the marketplace.24
In 1983, the warehouse competitor entered the market.' Pursuant to the oral agreement, Jewel reopened wage negotiations with the
Union.' Negotiations reached impasse and Jewel implemented its
final offer.27 As a result, wages were reduced below the minimum
amounts specified in the written CBA.'
The Union sought, and subsequently received, a court order to
compel arbitration. The Union also brought an unfair labor practice
the Union 'wanted to avoid problems as the only [United Food & Commercial Workers
Union] clerks' local with a reopener." Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 3 (No. 85 C 7876).
16. This clause would allow Jewel, during the term of the CBA, to reduce its
employee's wages to match those of the newly-opened unionized competitor. Merk at 897.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 897.
20. Id. at 891.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26.
27.
28.
vacation
29.

Id.
Id.
Id Specifically, wages were reduced up to $1.25 per hour and personal benefits and
days were decreased. Id.
See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 881 v. Jewel Food Stores
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complaint." After a long course of negotiations, Jewel agreed to settle the dispute by awarding backpay to its current employees in exchange for the Union's relinquishment of its unfair labor practice
complaint.' Jewel's backpay settlement, however, was not offered to
the group of approximately 2,000 employees who quit, retired, or
were fired from Jewel during the parties' 15-month dispute. 2 This
group eventually formed the class of plaintiffs in Merk.33
III.

THE MERK CASE HISTORY

The plaintiff's road to recovery lasted seven years and cumulated
in five published opinions detailing their legal battle. The plaintiff's
first cause of action consisted of a "hybrid" suit'" against Jewel and
the Union under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA), 35 as well as a direct § 301 claim against Jewel alone.'
Specifically, the hybrid suit alleged that Jewel breached the parties'
CBA by cutting wages and that the Union breached its duty of fair
representation to the plaintiffs by reaching a settlement offer with
Jewel that excluded them. These allegations raised what the district

Div., Jewel Cos., No. 84 C 1648 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 1985). Jewel counterclaimed that the
Union breached its oral reopener agreement by blatantly repudiating it. Id The court, in dismissing the claim, found that because Jewel did reopen the agreement, bargained to impasse,
and implemented its final offer, its pleadings did not allege that the Union disregarded a duty
it promised to perform. Id Jewel also filed a third-party complaint against the United Food
& Commercial Workers International Union alleging both fraudulent inducement and tortious
interference with contract. Id The court dismissed the latter claim. Id The former was subsequently dropped. Id.
30. Merk, 945 F.2d at 891.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id
34. See generally DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164
(1983) (explaining that "such a suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of action. The
suit against the employer rests on § 301, since the employee is alleging a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union's
duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act.").
35. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). This section provides:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organiza-tions, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
ICL
36. See Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., Jewel Cos., 641 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
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court termed "difficult labor law issues which appear to be of first
impression."37
The adjudication of the hybrid suit boiled down to the resolution
of this issue: did the Union owe a duty of fair representation to the
plaintiffs notwithstanding that the Jewel settlement was reached after
they left Jewel's employ?'s Interestingly, both the Union and the
plaintiffs agreed that no such duty existed.39 Jewel, however, argued
that it did. 4"
The court first determined that the Union's duty of fair representation extends no further than its authority under § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 41 to act as the bargaining
unit's exclusive bargaining agent.4' The court held that because the
plaintiffs were ex-employees at the time of the settlement offer and
because the plaintiff's interests in receiving a portion of the settlement
offer ran directly counter to the Union's duty to provide for its current members,43 the Union owed no duty of fair representation to
them." Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiff's hybrid suit.45
Two years later, the plaintiffs sought summary judgment against
Jewel regarding their "straight" § 301 claim.' The plaintiffs argued
they were entitled to summary judgment on the undisputed fact that

37. Id at 1025.
38. See id at 1027.
39. Id at 1027.
40. Id If the duty existed, the plaintiffs would be limited to litigating their hybrid suit
alone and would thus have to prove both prongs. If no duty existed, plaintiffs would have to
prove only that Jewel breached the CBA, a substantially lighter undertaking. Id
41. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). This section provides, in part, that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
Id
42. Merk; 945 F.2d at 1027.
43. The court explained that the plaintiffs, after leaving Jewel, had but one interest for
the Union to fight for - recovering their lost wages. Id at 1029. The other employees,
however, had broader interests in ensuring that the Union would not jeopardize their hopes
for obtaining good future wages and working conditions. Id The court noted that the Union,
by leaving the plaintiffs out of the settlement offer, "gave up nothing of economic value to
[the current members], but gave Jewel an economic plum." Id at 1030. Thus, for the Union
to achieve the plaintiff's interests they would necessarily be hurting the interests of the current members. This, the court concluded, was a classic case of conflict of interest. Id
44. Id at 1032.
45. Id at 1037. Jewel's motion to dismiss, as time-barred, plaintiff's direct § 301 suit
against Jewel was denied. Id
46. Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., Jewel Cos., 702 F. Supp. 1391 (N.D. 111.1988).
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Jewel unilaterally reduced wages in violation of the express wage
provision of the parties' written CBA.4 ' In its defense, Jewel offered
testimony regarding the oral reopener agreement." The plaintiffs
countered that such testimony was barred by the parol evidence
rule." First, the court found that oral supplements to CBAs are not
unenforceable and that the parol evidence rule would not act to exclude Jewel's reopener evidence.' Next, the court found that Jewel
submitted a sufficient amount of evidence to withstand the motion for
summary judgment."
The suit against Jewel did eventually reach trial. Jewel received
a jury verdict in its favor.' The plaintiffs then made a post-trial motion, arguing that the enforcement of the oral reopener was against
federal labor policy.' In making this argument, the plaintiffs relied

47. 1& at 1399.
48. Id.
49. Id
50. Id at 1400.
51. Id The court rejected plaintiffs argument that a provision in the CBA prohibited
oral supplements. Id at 1401. This provision provided that "[t]his agreement is subject to

amendment, alteration or addition only by a subsequent written agreement between, and executed by, the employer and the union.- Id The court determined that unlike an integration
clause, this provision appeared to apply only to supplements entered into after the CBA was
executed. Id Thus, it would not operate to preclude an oral supplement entered into at the
time Jewel and the Union executed the CBA. Id.
The court also rejected Jewel's argument that the mere fact the Union engaged in
negotiations with Jewel after the warehouse competitor entered the market was itself evidence
that the Union agreed to a reopener provision. Id at n.10. The court wrote: "That the Local
sought negotiations rather than a lawsuit is consistent with the federal labor policy to encourage the extrajudicial resolution of disputes rather than a reflexive rush to the courts. The
Local did not accept a modification to the collective bargaining agreement merely by discussing it." Id
52. Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div. Jewel Cos., 734 F. Supp. 330, 331 (N.D. Il1. 1990)
(Posner, J. sitting by designation), rev'd, 945 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

956 (1992).
53. Id. at 333. The plaintiffs also argued that if the Union and Jewel did agree to a
reopener, "they were not using the term as one of art." Md Specifically, plaintiffs argued that
Jewel and the Union did not intend that the relevant provisions of the CBA would be repealed, but instead that they would merely be suspended provided that Jewel bargained in
good faith and would reduce wages only if the parties reached impasse. Id Plaintiffs further
argued that Jewel failed to bargain in good faith, and instead "implemented a fixed pre-existing plan to reduce wages." Id Thus, plaintiffs concluded, the reopener was never activated
because terms of the reopener were not fully met. Id This argument was rejected by the
court as it determined that when a term of art, such as "reopener" is used, the parties can be
presumed to have used the term in its customary form as found in the trade or business in
which the contract was made. Id The court found that the plaintiffs offered no evidence to
overcome this presumption, and that the Union "had its remedies under the National Labor
Relations Act against Jewel's bargaining in bad faith. There is no indication it negotiated for
a contractual remedy as well." Id
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on case law disallowing oral modifications of CBAs where the agreements modified pension or welfare trusts established by the CBA.5'
Judge Posner rejected the plaintiff's argument.5 The court determined that:
Statutes like Landrum-Griffin and ERISA impose obligations in the
administrationof collective bargaining contracts; oral modifications,
unknown to the union rank and file, can upset entitlements created
by the contracts and enforced in administering them. But these
statutes do not seek to interfere with the negotiation of the agreement - the domain of the National Labor Relations Act, section
8(d) of which is a considered decision to allow oral agreements
when both parties prefer them.'
It is important to note that the court found the oral reopener
agreement was adopted during the contract's negotiation process, not
after the contract was signed.' Thus, the reopener did not modify
the contract, it was part of it."' As such, the court concluded that the
enforcement of the oral reopener was not against federal labor poli59
cy.
IV.

A.

THE RELEVANT CASE LAW

The Parol Evidence Rule
Case Law Prior to Merk

Some background on the parol evidence rule is necessary before
exploring its application in the courts. The rule itself is inappropriately named.' First, it is not a rule of evidence, but rather, a substantive law of contracts." This is because rules of evidence "bar some

54. Id; see, e.g., Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Behnke
Inc., 883 F.2d 454, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that, by law, employer contributions to
trust funds on behalf of employees must be pursuant to written agreements).
55. Merk 734 F. Supp. at 333.
56. Id (emphasis in original).
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id
60. See E.ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, § 7.2 at 193 (1990).
61. See id. at 194; 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 574 at 375 (1960).
At early common law, collective bargaining agreements were not regarded as contracts at all
because contract necessities such as consideration and capacity were thought to be lacking. 9
SAMUEL WII1STON, WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1020 at 244 (3rd ed. 1967). Gradually,
however, collective bargaining agreements have achieved the status of contracts. Id at 250-51.
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methods of proof to show a fact but permit that fact to be shown in
a different way. In contrast, the parol evidence rule bars a showing of
the fact itself - the fact that the terms of the agreement are other
than those in the writing."' Second, the rule is not limited to parol,
or oral, agreements; written documents may be suppressed under the
rule as well. 3
The rule itself has been defined as a vehicle which "simply"
affirms the primacy of a subsequent agreement over prior negotiations
and even prior agreements."' Specifically, the rule provides that
where there is either a completely or partially integrated writing,
evidence may not be introduced to contradict a term of the writing.'
Whether a writing is deemed fully or partially integrated depends
upon the degree the writing was intended by the parties to be an
expression of their entire agreement.67 A fully integrated agreement
contains the complete expression of the parties' agreement." A partially integrated agreements contains the final expression of the
terms the writing contains, but is not a complete expression of all the
terms agreed upon because some terms remain unwritten.70

62. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, at 194.
63. Id The rule has been more aptly referred to as the "Rule Against Contradicting Integrated writings." See 3 CORBIN, supra note 61, § 595 at 660 (Supp. 1992).
64. For a discussion of how "simple" the rule is, see Justin Sweet, Contract Making and
Parole Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036
(1968) (noting that "[t]his 'simple' rule is in fact a maze of conflicting tests, subrules, and
exceptions adversely affecting both the counseling of clients and the litigation process.").
65. FARNSWORH, supra note 60, § 7.2 at 197. Professor Corbin explained the rule as
follows:
Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or modified by subsequent agreement of the parties. No contract whether oral or written can be varied, contradicted, or discharged by an antecedent agreement. Today may control the
effect of what happened yesterday; but what happened yesterday cannot change the
effect of what happens today. This, it is believed, is the substance of what has
been unfortunately called the 'parol evidence rule.'
3 CORBIN, supra note 61, § 574 at 371-72.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 215 (1980).
67. FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, § 7.3 at 198.
68. Id
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 (2) provides that "[a]n agreement is
not completely integrated if the writing omits a consistent additional agreed term which is (a)
agreed to for separate consideration, or (b) such a term as in the circumstances might naturally be omitted from the writing."
70. FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, at 198. It has been written that:
This business of partial integration has never caught on . . . Courts having difficulty with the fundamental concept of integration are unwilling (or unable, and
with good reason) to split the imaginary hair even more finely by engaging in
another analysis, the outcome of which is so uncertain as to command no princi-
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The agreement must be termed partially or fully integrated to
determine what evidence, if any, is allowed to be introduced to elucidate the agreement.'1 If the agreement is partially integrated, evidence of prior agreements is admissible to supplement, though not
contradict, its terms?3 If the agreement is found to be fully integrated, no evidence may be offered to explain the agreement. 3
Is the issue of whether a writing is fully integrated one of law
or fact? One commentator has argued that this issue is always a question of fact.74 Most courts, however, reserve this question for the
judge as a matter of law.75
B.

The Parol Evidence Rule's Application
in the Courts

Federal courts have applied the parol evidence rule to collective
bargaining cases in different degrees.76 The Fifth Circuit, in Manville
Forest Products, Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union,'
held that contract law concepts, such as the parol evidence rule,
should not be applied at all to issues involving collective bargaining

pled authority. The best view . . . is that, when a court starts talking 'integration,'
it is viewing the document as a whole. Even those cases that purport to do otherwise ultimately wind up either talking this way, or losing control of the discussion
entirely, attempting to discuss esoteric principles that have never had any practical
value.
3 CORBIN, supra note 61, § 581 at 572 (1992 supp.).
71. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, at 460.
72. FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, § 7.3 at 198; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 216 (1).
73. FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, § 7.3 at 198; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 216 (1).
74. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 61, § 595 at 571.
75. FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, § 7.3 at 209; 3 CORBIN, supra note 61, § 595 at 571.
Realizing that the agreement might be deemed not fully integrated, or that a question of
credibility will arise, the trial judge, in the interests of judicial economy, often will have the
jury listen to the integration evidence as well. 3 CORBIN, supra note 61, § 595 at 659 (Supp.
1992).
76. In resolving substantive issues under § 301 of the LMRA, federal courts must apply
federal common law. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
In interpreting labor contracts, federal courts apply the traditional rules for contract interpretation, as long as their application is consistent with federal labor policy. See, e.g., Stewart v.
K.H.D. Deutz of America, Corp., 980 F.2d 698 (1993). While the parol evidence rule sounds
of a rule of procedure, it is instead a rule of contract formation. See Mohr v. Metro East
Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir. 1983). Thus, a uniform national parol evidence rule,
rather than the law of the state where the CBA was signed, must be applied. it
77. 831 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1987).
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agreements.78 The court, in affirming an arbitrator's decision to introduce parol evidence to show the parties intended to retain a certain
class of machine operators even though the CBA was silent on the
question, reasoned that the collective bargaining agreement "is more
than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.""
It is important to note that the court allowed the introduction of
the extrinsic evidence notwithstanding that the CBA contained both a
"no modification"' clause and a "zipper" 81 clause.' With regard to
the modification clause, the court explained that although the agreement could not be modified, the clause did not prohibit the arbitrator
from looking to extrinsic evidence to determine what provisions were
in fact part of the agreement.83 The zipper clause, the court noted,
did not require all the provisions in the CBA to be written; rather, it
simply required all agreements reached after the signing of the CBA
to be reduced to writing.' Because the arbitrator found that the
parties' retention of the class of machine operators was part of the
CBA, the zipper clause did not apply.
The Seventh Circuit, in Mohr v. Metro East Mfg. Co.," admitted parol evidence regarding an oral side agreement to modify the
parties CBA. The Mohr court, following the "sparse authority" on
point, found that the parol evidence rule should be applied to collective bargaining contracts. The court then engaged in a contract law
analysis and determined the CBA was not fully integrated; thus, the
parol evidence was admissible.' Specifically, the Mohr court concluded that the master agreement between the association of employers and the international union was not intended to be the complete

78. Id at 75.
79. Id quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960) (Steelworkers Trilogy).
80. This clause provided that "[the arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract
from, alter, amend or disregard any provision of this Agreement." Id. at 76.
81. This clause provided that "[a]ll modifications, amendments or supplemental agreements to this Agreement have been reduced to writing .... Any modification, amendment
or supplement executed after the effective date of this Agreement shall be void and of no
force and effect unless reduced to writing and approved by the parties . . . ." Id.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id
86. 711 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
87. Id at 72.
88. Id
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agreement between each employer and each local union and that the
parties' supplemental oral agreements governing their specific terms
of employment could, therefore, be introduced.'
The Third Circuit has allowed the introduction of parol evidence
in the context of labor relations as well. In Griesmann v. Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,' the court found that because the parties
labor contract91 was not fully integrated, extrinsic evidence should be
admitted to vary the contract's express provisions.' The case was
then remanded so that both union and the employer could offer evidence indicating whether the employer violated the employment contract by "dovetailing"93 additional cement drivers into the union's
seniority list.'
The Ninth Circuit has developed a long line of cases dealing
with the parol evidence rule in the area of collective bargaining. In
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers,"
the court found that "collective bargaining contracts by their very
nature cannot fairly be limited to their express provisions."' This
was because, "[a]s has been frequently pointed out, agreements of this
sort are far different in nature and purpose from the ordinary commercial agreement. They are in effect a compact of self-government."'" The court then remanded the case for a new trial so that the
parties could introduce evidence of their bargaining history as to the
arbitrability of the employer's resort to disciplinary suspensions.98

89. A
90. 776 F.2d 66 (3rd Cir. 1985).
91. The district court's determination that a letter and a posted notice drawn up by the
employer combined to constitute a CBA was found to be in error. Ia at 71. The court
found, however, that they constituted an "enforceable labor contract." lit
92. Id. at 72. See also Demirs v. Plexicraft, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 860, 862 (D.R.I. 1991)
(finding that where an employment agreement was not intended to be a complete integration
of the parties' negotiations, parol evidence is admissible to aid in its interpretation); Harden
v. Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1080, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(finding that an employee can introduce parol evidence under a less than fully integrated
employment contract).
93. "Dovetailing" refers to the practice of combining two separate seniority lists into one
after a group of employees are transferred to a new location. IaL at 69 n.3.
94. L at 72.
95. 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1962).
96. Id. at 246.
97. Id. at 247.
98. See id. at 249. The court found that the CBA was silent as to whether disciplinary
suspensions were arbitrable. Id. at 247. However, even when a CBA is clear on its face regarding its terms, the Ninth Circuit, in Communications Workers v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel.
Co., 337 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 1964) (Communications Workers 11), allowed the admission
of parol evidence so that the CBA may be read in light of the parties' bargaining history.
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Pacific Northwest was followed in Cappa v. Wiseman."9 The
Cappa court recognized the Ninth Circuit's "great difficulty of limiting collective bargaining agreements to their express terms."'10 The
court then made two important determinations: (1) the parol evidence
rule will not bar testimony where the CBA is not fully integrated;'.
and, more importantly, (2) national labor policy does not proscribe an
oral supplemental agreement " to the parties' written CBA.'0 3
In Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local
996,14 the Ninth Circuit took the application of the parol evidence
rule a step further. There, the union and employer, Certified, executed
a CBA which contained a no-strike provision."4 By its terms, the
CBA was to govern from March 1, 1974 to February 28, 1977.'
Certified alleged, however, that a bargaining agent for the union
entered into an oral side agreement with Certified which extended the
CBA on a "day to day" basis and required the union to give notice
48 hours before termination of the CBA. °4 The union struck on
March 1, 1977 without giving notice of termination.'" Certified argued the CBA was still in effect, based on the oral agreement, and
that striking without notice was thus in violation." The union countered with two arguments: first, the only binding agreement between
the parties was the written CBA; second, the written CBA could not
be orally modified because it contained a provision requiring all
amendments and modifications to be in writing." '
The court noted that courts, when interpreting collective bargaining agreements, have not adhered strictly to general contract rules"'

The court reasoned that -[a] new technical rule of evidence which would render incompetent
parol evidence of a party's intent would seem peculiarly inappropriate in the area of collective bargaining." Iet
99. 469 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'4 659 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 439.
101. Id
102. The agreement dealt with an oral understanding between the union and employer
limiting the industry-wide collective bargaining agreements' application as it related to the
scope of the bargaining unit. Id. at 438.
103. Id.
104. 597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
105. Id at 1270.
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id at 1271. For example, the court noted that consideration is not needed to make a
CBA enforceable, that a non-party may be bound by a CBA's provisions, and that some
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and that courts "should not be preoccupied with principles which
might apply to ordinary contracts."' The court then determined that
the parties' CBA could be orally modified notwithstanding the
agreement's provision to the contrary.13 The court held that its decision to allow into evidence such parol testimony was not counter to
federal labor policy."" In fact, the court concluded that its holding
effectuated labor policy by maintaining industrial peace; that is, encouraging the parties to negotiate, rather than resort to a strike."'
In contrast, there does exist a "handful""' of cases which hold
that the parol evidence rule should be used to bar testimony offered
to prove the existence of oral agreements in the context of labor
relations. In Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox,"7 the Sixth Circuit (adopting
verbatim the district court's opinion) excluded parol evidence offered
by the employer, Gatliff Coal, that the parties reached an oral side
agreement allowing Gatliff Coal to disregard the multi-employer and
union CBA and agree upon terms more suitable to both Gatliff Coal
and the union."' In so holding, the court reasoned that:
The National Labor Relations Act, in the public interest, has given
such collective bargaining agreements a more secure and stable
position in our National economy than that of ordinary common law
contracts which may be altered at pleasure by rendering ineffectual
and unavailable any collateral agreements between individual members of the collective bargaining group designed to obtain a diminution of the obligations of a particular employer ....",
The court determined that to hold otherwise "'would reduce the National Labor Relations Act to a mere futility and leave collective
agreements no stronger than the weakest members of the union."" '

terms of a CBA may bind the parties after its expiration. 1M1(citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id The CBA contained a provision which provided that "[n]o provision or term of
this agreement may be amended, modified, changed altered or waived except by written document executed hereto." Id The court wrote that "[i]t is settled that in the absence of a statute preventing oral modification of a contract, a written contract can always be orally modified, even if its express terms prohibit modification except in writing." Id See RESTATEAENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 353, comment b; 6 CORBIN, supra note 61, § 1295 at 206-08.
114. Certified Corp., 597 F.2d at 1271.
115. Id
116. Merk4 945 F.2d at 902 (Easterbrook, I., dissenting).
117. 152 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1945).
118. Id at 54-55 n.1.
119. Id at 56 n.1.
120. Id (quoting J.L Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)).
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To further buttress its holding, the court found that the NLRA
"contemplates that a collective bargaining agreement be in writing." 121 For these two reasons, the court concluded that Gatliff Coal
was not entitled to rely on the oral agreement it had with the un12
ion.
Gatliff Coal was followed in International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union, Local 509 v. Annshire Garment Co."s In Annshire,
the court wrote "[t]o suppress industrial strife based on this type of
controversy national labor policy requires that the clear and unambiguous requirements of the written collective bargaining agreement be
immune from attack found on a covert side agreement."'" The court
detailed two possible evils resulting from a contrary interpretation of
national labor policy:
One is the overzealous or unprincipled union negotiator who will
induce a management signature to a collective bargaining agreement
with side assurances that management will not have to comply with
certain controverted provisions. The other is management who will
avoid certain obligations required by the executed collective bargaining agreement and attempt to justify such action by an alleged oral
side agreement that compliance will not be required notwithstanding
the clear and unambiguous requirement if the written collective
bargaining agreement."
In N.D.K. Corp., 26 the NLRB, relying solely on the Gatliff
Coal rationale, found that "[niational labor policy requires that evidence of oral agreements be unavailing to vary the provisions of a
written collective-bargaining agreement on its face."'M Similarly, in
Restaurant Employees, Bartenders and Hotel Service Employees Welfare Fund v. Rhodes,'" the Supreme Court of Washington held that
the employer could not introduce evidence to show that a union agent
represented that it did not have to make monthly payments to the
health and welfare and pension funds on behalf of employees who
were not yet union members."

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

I& at 56.
Id.
65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769 (D. Kan. 1967).
Id. at 2772.
d.
278 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1986).
Id. at 1035.
99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2868 (1978).
See id. at 2869-71. The CBA provided that employees were required to join the
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C.

The Union's Ratification Requirement

The other body of labor law implicated by the facts of Merk
involves the Union's failure to ratify the reopener provision. Specifically, the issue becomes whether the oral reopener loses its legal
effect due to its failure to be ratified by the union rank and file as
required by the union's constitution.
At the outset it should be noted that it is well settled that a
union has no duty under the NLRA to submit an employer's proposal
for a collective bargaining agreement to its membership for ratification.'" Thus, the failure to ratify issue, such as the one found in
Merk, arises when a union self-imposes such an obligation through a
or simply makes an ad hoc
provision in its constitution or bylaws,
131
management.
with
ratify
to
agreement
In addressing the ramifications of ratification clauses on management, the NLRB in McLaughlin & Moran, Inc., 32 declared that, "as
a matter of law, it is none of the Employer's business how (or even
whether) the [union] obtains the employees' approval of the
Employer's offer."1 33 The Board added that "it is for the union, and
not the employer, to construe the meaning of the union's internal
requirements for ratification."" 3 The Board reasoned that to hold
otherwise, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement to arrive at a final settlement without the fear of being
forced into protracted litigation regarding the union's compliance
with its own procedures, clearly a collateral issue. The encouragebeen with the
ment of such industrial instability could not have
35
intendment of the [National Labor Relations] Act.
The Board, in conclusion, determined that it would be unlawful for
union within 30 days after hiring. Id. at 2869.
130. See, e.g., NLRB v. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. 980 F.2d 804, 809 (1st Cir. 1992).
131. See Vlillianihouse-Regency of Delaware, Inc. v. NLRB, 915 F.2d 631, 635 (lth Cir.
1990).
132. 299 N.L.R.B. 30 (1990).
133. Id. at 32.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 33 (quoting M & M Oldsmobile Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 903, 905-06 (1966), enforced, 377 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1967). To put it another way, the Board noted that -it would
not serve the statutory purpose of encouraging collective bargaining to allow unions to avoid
their contracts on the ground that they had failed to follow their own internal procedures."
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the employer to refuse to sign its collective bargaining agreement
because the union failed to follow the ratification requirements found
in its constitution and by-laws."
This holding has been reiterated by the Board for decades. 1" In
M & M Oldsmobile Inc., union officials informed the employer
that it would seek ratification of the agreement the parties had
reached.'39 After the employer was informed that a majority of the
employees had not voted for ratification, the employer requested a
hearing to determine if ratification was proper.'" The Board found
the employer to be in violation of the NLRA for questioning the
union's ratification procedures and failing to sign the agreement.'4'
In Houchens Market of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. NLRB, "2 union
officials, during the course of negotiations, told the employer that any
of its proposals would have to be ratified by the union membership. 43 After an agreement had been reached, the union officials
changed their position and insisted the agreement be implemented
without being ratified.'" The employer refused.'" The Board found
this refusal to be an unfair labor practice.'" The Sixth Circuit, in
enforcing the order, wrote:
The purpose of collective bargaining is to fix wages, hours and
conditions of work by a trade agreement between the employer and
his employees. This can be done satisfactorily only if a bargaining
agent is selected to represent all the employees with full power to

136. Id
137. See Merk, 945 F.2d at 903 (Easterbrook, L, dissenting).
138. 156 N.L.R.B. 903 (1966) enforced, 377 F.2d 712 (2nd Cir. 1967).
139. Id at 904.
140. Id. at 905.
141. Id at 906.
142. 375 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1967).
143. I, at 209.

144. I
145. Ad
146. L at 210. The Board found that the employer refused to bargain in good faith, in
violation of § 8(d) of the NLRA. Ad This section provides, in part, that:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession. ...
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speak in their behalf. The purpose of the statute would be largely
frustrated if the results of bargaining must be submitted to a vote of
currents
the employees, with all the misunderstandings and cross
7
sort.14
that
of
election
an
in
arise
inevitably
would
that
The court concluded that the union, because it was certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent, was empowered by its members to reach
a binding agreement without seeking ratification.'4
More recently, in Williamhouse-Regency of Delaware, Inc. v.
NLRB, 4 9 the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer that was notified by the union at the outset of their negotiations thatany tentative
agreement would have to be ratified by the membership'" was not
permitted later to insist that the agreement be ratified."' The court
wrote that a union's self-imposed ratification requirement is "essentially a restriction on the authority of its negotiators to execute an agreement reached at the bargaining table absent the approval of its membership .... But [it] is not treated by the Board as the functional
equivalent of the act of acceptance essential to the formation of a
contract......
Other courts have decided this issue by employing an agency
analysis. The basis for such theory may be found in § 301(b) of the
LMRA, which provides that "[a]ny labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined
3
in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents."' Subsection (e) further provides that "in determining whether any person is
acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts
performed where actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not
be controlling."'
In Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas v. Kraftco,

147. Id. at 212 (quoting NLRB v. Darlington Veneer Co., 236 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir.
1956)) (citation omitted). The court determined that the employer, by insisting on ratification,
was attempting to bargain with respect to a matter not encompassed within wages, hours, or
working conditions. Id. Instead, it was attempting to bargain about a matter "which was exclusively within the internal domain of the Union." I
148. Id
149. 915 F.2d 631 (11th Cir. 1990).
150. IM. at 633.
151. Id at 635-36.
152. Id. at 635.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1988).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1988).
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Inc.,"' the court applied the above sections to conclude that although the union had a ratification requirement, the employer was
permitted to rely on an non-ratified side agreement it reached with
union negotiators."' The court found that as a general rule an employer is entitled to rely on the "apparent authority" of the union
negotiators to conclude a CBA, where there is a basis for such reliance, notwithstanding a ratification requirement. ' " In finding that the
union president had the apparent authority to enter into the side
agreement, the court pointed to the fact that such authority may be
inferred from the custom or practice of the parties and that the parties
had twice before executed non-ratified side agreements.""
V.

THE MERK DECISION

A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority relied on two theories to reverse the jury verdict
Jewel received at the district court level.' First, the majority held
that the parol evidence rule should be applied to prohibit Jewel's
testimony regarding the existence of the oral reopener agreement."w
Next, the court held that because the reopener agreement was not
disclosed to the union membership, and thus not ratified as required
by the Union's constitution, Jewel was not entitled to rely on it."'
The majority began its discussion of the parol evidence rule with

155. 799 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).
156. Id at 1114.
157. Id at 1112. See NLRB v. Truckdrivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union No.
100, 532 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir.) cert. denie4 429 U.S. 859 (1976); NLRB v. International
Union of Elevator Constructors Local No. 8, 465 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1972).

158. Central States, 794 F.2d at 1113-14. See also Moreau v. International Brotherhood of
Firemen & Oilers, 851 F.2d 516, 519 (Ist Cir. 1988) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for the employer because it demonstrated that the international union informed the employer that the local union had authority to enter into "side agreements," thus proving apparent authority existed).
159. Specifically, the plaintiffs made five arguments challenging the verdict against them:
(1) the district court improperly admitted the oral reopener evidence in violation of the parol
evidence rule; (2) the reopener agreement should not be enforced because it violated the

Union's constitution requiring ratification; (3) national labor policy and section 8(d) of the
LMRA militate against the enforcement of a secret oral agreement which contradicts the

terms of a written and ratified CBA; (4) numerous evidentiary errors were made by the district court requiring a new trial; and, (5) the district court should not have dismissed their

claim for punitive damages. Merk. 945 F.2d at 892.
160. Id, 945 F.2d at 894.
161. Id at 898.
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a standard contract law analysis." The majority noted that it was
proper for the district court to leave to the jury the question of
whether the contract was fully integrated, because the CBA did not
indicate on its face whether it incorporated all the terms the parties
agreed to. 63 In addition, the court agreed with the jury's determination that the agreement was not a full integration because both the
Union and Jewel conceded there was an additional oral term to the
CBA.'" The court further acknowledged that because the written
CBA was not fully integrated, it would have been proper for the jury
to consider the reopener testimony and ultimately conclude that Jewel
did, in fact, bargain for a full economic reopener.' Thus, the majority noted that if it applied a standard contract law analysis, it
would have allowed the parol evidence to be introduced."
The Merk majority, however, was not pleased with this "mechanical application" of the parol evidence rule. 7 Explaining that "our
analysis of the parol evidence issue cannot proceed in a vacuum
abstracted from the particular setting from which it arose," the majority found that because the oral agreement supplemented a collective
bargaining agreement, national labor policy is implicated.' Only
after considering national labor policy did the court conclude that it
would be improper to enforce the clandestine oral reopener."
In determining exactly what national labor policy mandated, the
majority wrote:
[Tihe laws regulating labor relations would have little substance if
the central provisions of the collective compact could be nullified by
means of secret side agreements. Union officials and management
would then be free quietly to barter away basic guarantees contained
in the collective bargaining agreement and relied upon by all union
members."s '
The court continued that in order to avoid potential conflicts in labor
relations, "collective bargaining agreements must be more secure than

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See
Id
Id
Id
Id
See
Id
Id
Id

id., at 892-93.
at 893.

id

at 894.
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garden variety contracts." 7'
The court presented various cases to support its holding that
national labor policy proscribed an oral reopener which contradicts the
written CBA. The court focused on what it termed the "seminal case"
of this nature, Gatliff Coal. This case, the court wrote, held that
the NLRA "clearly precluded the [employer's] reliance upon a prior
or contemporaneous oral agreement to modify the terms of the written
collective bargaining agreement."" The court noted that Gatliff Coal
was followed in Annshire Garment, a district court decision from
Kansas, decided in 1967."74 The majority explained that Annshire
Garment court, in order to suppress industrial strife, invoked national
labor policy to allow the clear and unambiguous terms of the written
CBA to be immune from attack based on a secret side agreement.'
The court also added a string citation, which included two cases,
N.D.K. Corp. 6 and Rhodes," to further reiterate the proposition
that national labor policy makes parol evidence unavailing to modify
a written CBA.'78
The court determined, however, that the "real danger posed by
this reopener stems from its secrecy and not simply from its oral
character."' The court found that Jewel and the Union explicitly
agreed to keep the reopener hidden from the Union membership."w
Specifically, the court found:
Jewel is hardly an unsophisticated employer. Aware of the secrecy
surrounding the oral reopener, it must have drawn the obvious conclusion that the terms of the side agreement would not be submitted
for ratification or even disclosed to the Union membership. Jewel
now argues that it believed the secrecy was intended solely to keep
the reopener hidden from the International Union. But whether concealment was motivated by a desire to keep the side agreement
from the membership or from the International is irrelevant: the
reopener was in fact kept from the membership and Jewel was on

171. Id
172. 152 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1945); see also supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
173. Merk, 945 F.2d at 894.
174. Id
175. Id
176. 278 N.L.R.B. 1035 (1986); see supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
177. 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2868 (1978); see supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
178. Merk, 945 F.2d at 894-95.
179. Id at 895.
180. Id The court reviewed the district court's denial of the plaintiff's judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo. Id at 892.
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notice of this fact."'

This meant that Union members who reasonably thought they had a
secure CBA were, in fact, at the mercy of a secret reopener which,
the court found, "strikes at the heart of the CBA" and "throws open
the most central provisions governing wages and benefits .....""
The majority used this secrecy concern to conclude that it was in
error for the district court to rely on the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Mohr v. Metro East Mfg. Co"8 to allow the introduction of the reopener testimony.184 The court noted that the Mohr decision, which
allowed the introduction of oral agreements between the local union
and employer to modify a CBA reached between the employers association and the international union, was unlike the scenario in Merk
for two reasons."' First, the local union membership in Mohr knew
of the oral modifications." Second, the oral agreements there dealt
with only peripheral matters."
The court, however, did not rest its entire holding on its secrecy
analysis and Gatliff Coal. The court also held, as a matter of federal
law, that Jewel was not entitled to rely on the oral reopener when it
knew it was not ratified by the Union's rank and file." The majority wrote that the "[flailure to ratify under circumstances where an
employer is aware of both of the ratification requirement and of the
failure to comply with it may invalidate an employer's claims under
the unratified agreement." 89
The court recognized an exception to this general rule. If an
employer could demonstrate a past practice of non-ratification of
contract terms, it could establish a waiver of the ratification requirement. " The court found, however, that Jewel "failed to demonstrate
any established history of non-ratification of substantial terms of the

181. Id at 897.
182. Id at 895.
183. 711 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
184. See Merk 945 F.2d at 895.
185. Id.
186. Id
187. Id
188. Id at 898.
189. Id at 896. See Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747 (3rd Cir.
1977); Meyerson v. Contracting Plumbers Ass'n, 606 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
190. Merk, 945 F.2d at 896. The court wrote that Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc, 799 F.2d 1098, 1113-14 (6th Cir. 1986), suggested in dicta
that well-trenched practices establishing a history of non-ratification may signify a waiver of
the ratification requirement. Id.
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labor contract."19' It noted that although "peripheral" terms of the
CBA, such as the seniority system and personal days were regarded
by Jewel and the Union as binding without ratification, these terms
did not rise to the significance of the reopener before the court which
effectively repealed the employee's wages." The court reasoned that
it would not infer waiver from past practices of non-ratification of
terms of such "trifling magnitude," for to do so would encourage
unions to submit even trivial issues to its membership simply to
avoid such waiver."' This, the court found, would violate national
labor policy."9
It is important to note that in an attempt to prove a history of
non-ratification, and thus waiver, Jewel introduced evidence that the
parties had agreed to an non-ratified reopener provision in their 1969
CBA, which allegedly reopened wages and renegotiated them higher
if the Teamsters Union attempted to organize Jewel's employees.'
Nonetheless, the court concluded this 1969 reopener would not operate as a waiver because the 1969 reopener protected all the parties," while the 1983 reopener was a "controversial" provision allowing Jewel to unilaterally cut wages if a competitor entered the
marketplace." That is, because the 1969 reopener was not analogous to the 1983 reopener, the former could not be used to prove a
ratification waiver of the latter.'"
The majority also disapproved of the district court's finding that
the 1983 reopener may be relied on by Jewel even in the absence of

191.

Id at 896 (emphasis in original).

192. Id In finding that the reopener provision should not be equated with the provisions
dealing with the seniority system or personal days to determine waiver, the court wrote that
"the reopening of labor contracts during their term is deemed so significant that it is expressly forbidden by section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act except when provided by
contract. This provision argues strongly against unratified reopeners." Id See generally Texaco
Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1984).
193. Merk, 945 F.2d at 896.
194. Id
195. Id at 896-97.
196. This was true, wrote the court, because Jewel would be able to keep the Teamsters
out of its stores, the Union would retain its membership, and the rank and file would possibly receive a raise in salary. Id at 897.
197. Id at 897. The court wrote that "itwould not have been difficult for Jewel to predict that such a provision would have been at least highly controversial and might well have
been overwhelmingly defeated by vote of the membership." Id The court noted that when
the 1983 reopener was submitted to the membership in connection with the plaintiff's suit

against the Union, it was voted down by a large margin. Id
198.

See id
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a past practice of non-ratification." The district court, relying on
Chrysler Workers Ass'n v. Chrysler Corp.,' found that as long as
Jewel did not have clear notice that the Union was acting in bad faith
against its membership in agreeing to the reopener, Jewel was entitled
to believe it was a binding provision."0 '
The majority found this interpretation of Chrysler Workers to be
"inapposite," for the parol evidence there consisted of a side letter
agreement, dealing merely with worker's transfer rights, and was not
kept hidden from the union membership.' Such an agreement was
not analogous to the economic reopener in Merk, thus, the court
found that reliance on Chrysler Workers was not proper. 3 In addition, the majority disagreed with the dissent's view of the need for
flexibility in labor relations. Although the majority agreed that flexibility is a virtue in collective bargaining, it "should hardly extend to
surreptitious downward adjustments of basic wages. Such changes, if
concealed, are highly destabilizing, producing strikes and lawsuits
which the national labor policy does indeed eschew." 2"
The majority also added that the dissent "protests overmuch"
about its reliance on Gatliff Coal.' The court noted that "the dissent cites no more recent case on point ... and is unable to find any
case which holds contra to Gatliff Coal."' The court concluded
that such a case could not be found "probably because the principles
of fairness underlying Gatliff Coal are still central to the labor law of
the land."'
B. The Dissent's Opinion in Merk
"Labor law emphasizes flexibility, not certainty." 2" This conclusion pervades Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion. It flows, the
dissent argued, from the idea that collective bargaining agreements are
"relational contracts;" that is, they merely establish a framework from

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

141
834 F.2d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1033 (1988).
See Merk, 734 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. IM. 1990).
Merk, 945 F.2d at 897.
See id.
Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 899.
Id.

Id.
I. at 901.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 8
Hofsira Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 10:2

which the parties may resolve their differences.' A CBA is merely
a framework, the dissent argued, for two reasons. First, it is not possible for the negotiators to reduce to writing all of the understandings
and practices (even all of the important ones) which comprise a
CBA 3" Second, labor contracts govern a myriad of labor relations
issues, many of which, due to a changing marketplace, must be modifled at a date subsequent to the contract's execution.
The dissent, in explaining why the majority was incorrect in
concluding that labor agreements must be more secure than ordinary
commercial contracts, wrote:
It is perverse to say that the contracting process in labor must be
more formal than the contracting process in shipping or construction
or natural resources. You can define how much coal to sell and
where to deliver it; you can set the duration of a charter party.
Labor agreements govern the ongoing relations among thousands of
persons and affect matters not so easy to specify. Rigidity backfires.
Competitive conditions and technology change. Labor relations must
change too .... Failure to adjust to new developments means failure in product markets (look at the automobile and railroad industries), and when the employer slips in product markets labor takes
the fall."
Then, in an effort to define what national labor policy mandates
in cases such as these, the dissent turned to the labor statutes. The
NLRA, wrote the dissent, requires only one type of agreement to be
in writing: pension plans. 3 This signifies that Congress left to the
parties themselves the decision as to whether the remainder of their
CBA would be wholly in writing, or partially or fully oral." 4 In
fact, noted the dissent, Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-201, 2-202,
and 2-2092" have the effect of making commercial contracts more

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id
212. Id (emphasis in original).
213. Id. at 900.
214. Id The dissent added:
If labor policy really emphasized stability . . . the NLRA would require the commitment of all agreements to writing, would require [union] leaders to submit them
to vote by members, and would require the written pact to be circulated far
enough in advance of the vote that it could be digested and intelligently debated.
Labor law requires none of these things, as my colleagues concede.

Id
215.

Uniform Commercial Code (1978). Section 2-201 sets forth formal requirements and
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secure against oral modifications than labor contracts are."6
The dissent cited a number of United States Supreme Court
decisions to demonstrate that the Court has held that labor contracts
require more flexibility than ordinary contracts. ' The dissent noted
two cases in particular. In Transportation-CommunicationEmployees
v. Union Pacific R.R, 1 8 the Court wrote that a CBA "'is not...
governed by the same old common-law concepts which control such
private contracts .... In order to interpret such an agreement it is
necessary to consider the scope of other related collective bargaining
agreements, as well as the practice, usage, and custom pertaining to
all such agreements."' 2 9 In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,' noted the dissent, the Court found that under both the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, flexibility was a
hallmark of labor relations and that courts should not frown upon
informal arrangements."
The dissent reasoned that because national labor policy emphasizes flexibility, a court should not apply the parol evidence rule in a
fashion as to prohibit oral side agreements.' In support of this
proposition, the dissent cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Manville
Forest Products Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union,M" which held that the parol evidence rule should not be applied
at all in the context of collective bargaining. 4 Manville Forest
Products, wrote the dissent, stands for the proposition, which runs directly counter to the majority's analysis, that labor and management
may not have a fully integrated CBA, no matter how strongly the
parties prefer the benefits of certainty."'

the Statute of Frauds; Section 2-202 relates to parol or extrinsic evidence; and, Section 2-209
encompasses with modification, rescission and waiver.
216. Merk 945 F.2d at 900-01.
217. 1d. at 901-02, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 578-81 (1960); McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 357 U.S. 265, 273-74
(1958).
218. 385 U.S. 157 (1966).
219. Merk, 945 F.2d at 901, quoting Union Pacific, 385 U.S. at 160-61.
220. 491 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1989).
221. Merk, 945 F.2d at 901-02.
222. See id. at 902.
223. 831 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1987).
224. Id. at 75-76.
225. Merl; 945 F.2d at 902. As to this finding, the dissent wrote:
I am no more enamored of an approach that dishonors attempts to put everything
in writing than I am of an approach that dishonors oral agreements when the
parties did not want their writing to be complete. There is a happy middle ground:
Parties may choose for themselves.
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The dissent also noted that courts regularly hold that arbitrators
need not follow the parol evidence rule when interpreting collective
bargaining agreements.' Courts realize, wrote the dissent, that because "collective bargaining agreements are incomplete, and so much
of labor relations consists in oral understandings, arbitrators may use
these oral exchanges to supplement or even contradict the written
2
terms."
The dissent also found fault with Gatliff Coal' and the "smattering of unreviewed decisions by district courts, all more than a
generation old," upon which the majority relied to buttress its holding.' Gatliff Coal, wrote the dissent, is based in part on a premise
that it obtained by misreading H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB.' Heinz, the
dissent noted, merely affords a union a written memorial of their
agreement with the employer by holding that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer, after having reached a final agreement with
a union, to refuse to sign the agreement when its reduced to writing.3 The dissent concluded that the Gatliff Coal court was thus in
error to use Heinz to stand for the proposition that the NLRA intended that all CBA's be in writing."
The dissent found Gatliff Coal to be unpersuasive for another
reason as well. The Gatliff Coal court, wrote the dissent, attempted to
solve the problem of a member of a multi-employer bargaining unit
refusing to sign the agreement reached with the union, arguing that
the local union's officials said it would not have to. 3 Today, wrote
the dissent, this problem is not dealt with as one of parol evidence,
but rather, as the NLRB determined in 1958, it is dealt with by
filing an unfair labor practice charge. "3 The dissent then noted that
after the Board solved the multiemployer problem in 1958, "Gatliff
vanished without a trace."'

Id at 903.
226. Id. at 901.
227. Id
228. 152 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1945).
229. Merk, 945 F.2d at 902.
230. 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
231. Merk 945 F.2d at 902.
232. See id; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
233. Merk, 945 F.2d at 902.
234. See Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958).
235. Merk 945 F.2d at 902.
236. Id. Judge Easterbrook further noted:
My colleagues think it significant that I have not found a case disapproving Gatliff
by name. Guilty as charged. Plea in mitigation: As other courts take no notice of
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The dissent next attacked the majority's ratification analysis, raising four important issues. First, whether a provision in a union's
constitution has a legal effect on the validity of a CBA.s? Relying
on McLaughlin & Moran, Inc." and its progeny, the dissent declared that, as a matter of federal law, union negotiators have the authority to enter into binding agreements irrespective of whether the
union's constitution provides otherwise. 9 The dissent argued that
this principle was "conclusive against plaintiffs." 2' The dissent added, "I cannot find any contrary holding," and that "my colleagues,
who extol the importance of stability, also promote the sort of litigation regarding internal union procedures that, the Board and other
circuits believe, undermines stability."241
Second, even assuming that the Union's internal procedures do
have an affect on the CBA, the question becomes whether Jewel had
knowledge that the Union's negotiators would keep the oral reopener
secret.24 The dissent pointed out that Jewel denies having such
knowledge, and the jury verdict in Jewel's favor "hardly resolves this
question against it." 3 The dissent also noted that it was contradictory that the majority distinguished McLaughlin & Moran based on the
employer's lack of knowledge there, while it ignored Jewel's argument that it too lacked knowledge.2 " In any event, declared the dissent, the question of knowledge is not a factor when the Board, or
other circuits, determine this issue. 4S
Third, the dissent asked, "[w]hy should Jewel be bound by the
provisions favorable to the union (those the union's officers told the
membership about) but be unable to avail itself of the provisions

Gatliff, there are no citations to collect. The Supreme Court has never cited Gatliff.
No court of appeals has cited it since 1964 when Lewis v. Owens, 338 F.2d 740,
.A natural person miss742 (6th Cir. 1963), pointedly declined to rely on it ...
ing for seven years is presumed dead. Justice Holmes remarked that 'the reports of
a given jurisdiction in the course of a given generation take up pretty much the
whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view.' Gatliff has
been missing for seven years plus a generation, which speaks more eloquently than
express disapproval.
I& at 902 n.l. (citation omitted).
237. Id.at 903.
238. 299 N.L.R.B. 30 (1990).
239. Merk, 945 F.2d at 903.
240. Id
241. Id
242. Id. at 903-04.
243. Id at 904.
244. See ide
245. 1&
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favorable to itself?" 2 The dissent argued that a defect in ratification
should affect the entire CBA, not simply the oral aspect. 47
Fourth, the dissent asked "[w]hy is Jewel, as opposed to the
union, answerable to persons injured by defects in the ratification
process?"' The dissent argued that the plaintiff's claim in Merk
sounded like a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation, a
cause of action that plaintiffs originally brought but was subsequently
dismissed by the district court. "
The dissent also disagreed with the majority on the issue of
whether the parties had a history of non-ratification. The dissent noted
that the jury found the parties had a history of non-ratified oral
agreements.' Then, in countering the majority's finding that the
previous non-ratified agreements dealt with issues too trivial to establish a waiver of an agreement such as an economic reopener, the
dissent wrote "[m]y colleagues deem details such as seniority and
days off to be trivial - questionable as an original matter, but no
ground for upsetting the jury's contrary decision on the same point.
Especially not when one of the examples presented to the jury was
another oral reopener agreement!""'
The dissent then argued that the result of the majority's waiver
analysis makes collective bargaining agreements less, not more, secure." This, the dissent wrote, is because labor and management
cannot know whether their oral agreement is binding until they go to
court and find out how "important" the agreement is.' 3 The dissent
found this outcome unsatisfactory because "[n]egotiators need to know
while they are dickering which agreements will be enforced and
which will not. .. ."
In conclusion, Judge Easterbrook argued that the majority played
favorites in this case.' s It was contradictory that the majority refused to entertain Jewel's argument that the reopener was actually to
246. Id
247. Id
248. Id
249. Id
250. See id
251. Id In reply to the majority's argument that the parties' 1969 reopener was different
than the 1983 reopener because the 1969 reopener benefitted all parties, the dissent wrote
"[t]his sounds more like a lawyer's closing argument to a jury than like a reason why the
jury's verdict must be set aside." Id at 905.
252. See id at 905.
253. Id

254. Id
255.

See id at 906.
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the benefit of the Union's membership, finding that "it is not for us
to decide whether the reopener would have ultimately benefitted or
harmed the Union membership,"' when the majority did make this
determination regarding the parties' 1969 reopener.' The dissent
wrote: "This is special pleading. Reopeners are OK when they help
the employees but not when they help the employer. Such a disposition bears no resemblance to a rule of law. It is a thumb on the
scales of justice." 8
VI.

ANALYSIS

In determining whether the parol evidence rule should operate to
exclude Jewel's reopener testimony in Merk, both the majority and
the dissent sought refuge under national labor policy for their respective positions. "9 Ultimately, however, the majority fashioned its view
of the parol evidence rule and national labor policy through Gatliff
Coal.m
Gatliff Coal, decided in 1945, does not represent the view of
national labor policy that other circuits have taken. The Ninth Circuit
has consistently allowed the introduction of parol evidence in the
context of labor relations. 6' The Ninth Circuit's holding in Certified
Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local 9962 is of
particular importance. The Certified court allowed the introduction of
parol evidence to modify the parties CBA and admonished courts for
being preoccupied with ordinary contract law principles such as the
parol evidence rule." Implicit in this holding is the court's accession that if the agreement, instead of being a CBA, was a garden
variety contract, it might, under an ordinary contract law analysis, be
insulated from oral modification by the application of the parol evidence rule.' However, because the document is a labor compact,
which is necessarily a less integrated agreement than a garden variety
contract, the parol evidence rule should not operate to bar testimony

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id at 897.
Id; see supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
Merk, 945 F.2d at 906 (references to page numbers omitted).
Compare Id. at 894 with ld at 900 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
152 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1945).
See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id at 1271.
See id
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regarding the parties side agreement.2' The Merk majority, in direct
contrast, first found that in applying an ordinary contract law analysis,
the parol evidence rule would not operate to bar the oral testimony,26 then used the rule in the context of labor policy to exclude
the oral testimony.
The Certified court was not alone in holding that a CBA which
was not fully integrated could be supplemented by the parties oral
agreements. Part IV of this Comment set forth a number of cases,
from various circuits, in which courts have admitted parol evidence to
modify the parties CBA. Together, these cases clearly indicate that
labor contracts are not as secure as Merk majority deems them to
be.' Thus, the majority did not follow the mandate of national labor policy, it created its own.
The Merk majority responded to this adverse case law by determining that the facts of Merk make it distinguishable. The majority
cited the fact that the reopener was not ratified and remained hidden
from the Union membership.' Whether the reopener was ratified
should not, however, be used by the court to prevent Jewel from
relying on it. As other circuits and the Board have determined, issues
involving a union's constitution and bylaws are matters wholly internal to the union."' An employer must play no role in these affairs.2 In fact, the employer is subject to unfair labor practice
charges for insisting that a union follow its own ratification procedures.'
The relevant case law thus undercuts both the majority's holding
that the parol evidence rule must be applied to make labor contracts
more secure, and that a failure ratify a labor proposal makes such
proposal empty under the law. Therefore, the majority was forced to
expend much judicial energy in circumvention. First, the majority, as
mentioned above, differentiated the case law allowing parol testimony
into evidence because in those cases the oral agreements introduced

265. Id.
266. Merk, 945 F.2d at 893.
267. Id at 894.
268. See Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1500 (1959) (concluding that "collective agreements . . . are less complete and more loosely
drawn than many other contracts; therefore there is much more to be supplied from the context in which they were negotiated.").
269. Merk, 945 F.2d at 895, 896.
270. See supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
271. Id
272. Id
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were not kept hidden from the union membership.'
Second, the majority was forced to determine that the oral agreement in Merk was more significant to the parties than were the agreements in these distinguishable cases, and therefore should not be
admitted into evidence.' Third, in an effort to quash Jewel's argument that the parties had a history of non-ratification, the majority
differentiated the previous non-ratified oral reopener agreement that
Jewel and the Union had, from the 1983 reopener, by finding that the
1969 reopener benefitted all the parties, while the 1983 reopener did
not."7
This judicial energy was misplaced. Instead of contorting the
parol evidence rule and the legal effect of a union's ratification requirement to hold Jewel responsible for the plaintiff's loss, the court
should have placed the liability on the Union. A quick glance at the
Merk case history reveals that the plaintiffs thought their Union was
at fault, for they first chose to commence a hybrid cause of action
under § 301
of the LMRA which, of course, included the Union as a
27 6
defendant.
The plaintiff's, however, did not act fast enough. When they
instituted the action against their Union for failing to include them in
settlement offer reached with Jewel, the plaintiffs were no longer
Jewel employees and were not members of the bargaining unit; thus,
the district court dismissed the action.' r However, Jewel and the
Union, as well as the majority and dissent in Merk, all concurred that
the reopener agreement remained secret at the insistence of the
Union's negotiators. Therefore, it seems intuitive that the Union be
responsible for the plaintiff's damages. 78
One approach that may be utilized to hold the Union responsible
is to invoke the theory of promissory estoppel.' Promissory estop-

273. Merk, 945 F.2d at 895.
274. d at 897.
275. Id.
276. Id at 891.
277. See Merk, 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also supra notes 34-45 and
accompanying text.
278. Towards this end, courts have determined that § 411 (a) of the Bill of Rights of
Members of Labor Organizations (29 U.S.C. § 411(a)) protects a union member's right to
vote for ratification where the union's constitution has such a provision, and that former
employees may state a cause of action under this statute against their union. See Christopher
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 644 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1981); Trail v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1976).
279. This theory has its jurisdictional basis in § 301 of the LMRA. Although this section
provides district courts with jurisdiction over contracts between an employer and a labor
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pel, an equitable doctrine whose "hallmark ... is its flexible application," exists to "avoid injustice in particular cases.' 2" The doctrine
has been accepted in labor relations actions."1
The doctrine of promissory estoppel provides that "[a] promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee ... and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise."' To prevail under this theory, a
party must show: (1) a substantial change in its position; (2) which
was, or should have been, foreseeable by a reasonable person in the
promisor's position; and, (3) such change in position must have been
in reliance upon an actual promise by the promisor."
In Merk, the Union allegedly promised Jewel that if a warehouse
competitor entered the marketplace the wage provision of the CBA
would be reopened.' Relying on this actual promise, Jewel allegedly relinquished its insistence on a most favored nations clause.'
Such a relinquishment is substantial, for without a most favored nations clause Jewel is prohibited from reducing union wages in an
effort to match a competitor's lower wage rates. This clearly hampers
Jewel's competitive position in the marketplace. In addition, there can
be no question that Jewel's action was foreseeable, because the Union
promised to agree to an oral reopener clause with the purpose of
having Jewel drop its most favored nations clause.'

organization, the term "contracts" has been interpreted to include suits based on promissory
estoppel. See Retail Clerks International Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, (1962);
Byerly v. Duke Power Co., 217 F.2d 803 (1954); Morauer & Hartzell, Inc. v. International
Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 77, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2087 (D.D.C. 1974).
280. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59
(1984).
281. See Frech v. Pensacola Steamship Ass'n, 903 F.2d 1471 (lth Cir. 1990); Apponi v.
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. 809 F.2d 1210 (6th Cir) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987); Acri v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 781 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816
(1986); Hass v. Darigold Dairy Products Co., 751 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1985); Morauer &
Hartzell, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 77, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2087 (D.D.C. 1974).
282. RESTATEmENT (SECoND) oF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
283. Morauer & Hartzell Inc., 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2090.
284. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
285. Id
286. As an alternative theory, the court may have found that the reopener agreement was
an independent contract for the purposes of § 301(a). In Retail Clerks International Ass'n v.
Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962), the Court explained that for an agreement to be
termed a "contract" in this setting, "[it is enough that [it] is clearly an agreement between
employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between
them," and that it "resolved a controversy arising out of, and importantly and directly affect-
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The court in Merk, however, utilized the parol evidence rule and
the Union's ratification requirement to preempt Jewel's effort to prove
that a reopener existed, because the court was concerned with protecting the plaintiff's expectations in the written CBA.' Deciding the
case on a promissory estoppel theory, however, does not force the
court to abandon the plaintiffs. It simply allows Jewel raise, as a
defense against the Union, the fact that the Union's negotiators made
a binding promise during the parties' negotiating sessions.' Allowing Jewel to raise this defense not only allows Jewel to exonerate
itself from liability, but it places the responsibility with the party that
effectuated the plaintiff's losses--the Union.'
The alternative, as taken in Merk, is to exclude the reopener
testimony in the name of the formality of national labor policy.'
The effect of the Merk decision reveals that this path leads to a rather dubious result. What should an employer in Jewel's position do
after Merk? If the employer informs the union that the parties' side
agreement is not valid until ratified as mandated by the union's constitution, it would commit an unfair labor practice.29' If, on the other
hand, the employer accepted the reopener and relied on it without
ratification, a court following Merk would find the agreement was
empty under the law. 2 Such a no-win outcome for an employer
cannot be mandated by national labor policy.
Anthony Carabba

ing, the employment relationship." Id at 28. Under this theory, the agreement Jewel and the
Union had to relinquish the most favored nations clause in exchange for the reopener clause
would be deemed a contract separate from the CBA, enforceable against the Union.
287. Merk, 945 F.2d at 896 (noting "Union members who reasonably believed that they
were guaranteed a fixed rate of pay for the duration of the CBA unexpectedly found their
wages slashed at mid-term.").
288. See Frech, 903 F.2d 1471, 1476; Hass, 751 F.2d 1096, 1100; Morauer & Hartzell
88 L.R.tLM. (BNA) 2087, 2090.
289. Forcing the Union to pay damages is not an unjust result. The Union's membership
elected the Union as its exclusive collective bargaining representative. The membership receives great benefits when the negotiators leave the bargaining table with a CBA favorable to
the Union. They must be prepared, however, to accept any losses occasioned by the Union as
well.
290. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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